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Summary
Time discounting is thought to influence decision-making in almost every sphere of life, including 
personal finances, diet, exercise and sexual behavior. In this article we provide evidence on 
whether a national poverty alleviation program in Kenya can affect inter-temporal decisions. We 
administered a preferences module as part of a large-scale impact evaluation of the Kenyan 
Government’s Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children. Four years into the program 
we find that individuals in the treatment group are only marginally more likely to wait for future 
money, due in part to the erosion of the value of the transfer by inflation. However among the 
poorest households for whom the value of transfer is still relatively large we find significant 
program effects on the propensity to wait. We also find strong program effects among those who 
have access to credit markets though the program itself does not improve access to credit.
1. Introduction
Time preference, the relative importance individuals give to present versus future 
consumption, is a topic that has long captured the interest of economists. This interest is 
sparked by the belief that the time preference parameter is a crucial determinant of decisions 
in virtually every sphere imaginable, from risky sex to entrepreneurship, human capital 
investment and even obesity. The study of time preference has a long history in psychology 
where it is linked to self-control and emotional states (Damasio 1994; Bechara and Damasio 
1997). In economics on the other hand the origins of time preference can be traced back to 
models of savings, growth and development (Rae 1905; Samuelson 1937; Smith 1776). 
More recently economists have begun to use both laboratory and small scale field 
experiments to understand whether time preference affects financial decisions and the role of 
income or wealth in determining inter-temporal choice. This paper contributes to this 
literature using a large scale field survey in which households were randomly assigned to 
immediately enter into a national cash transfer program. The size of our sample and the fact 
that it comes from an actual program which currently reaches 170,000 households in Kenya 
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implies a degree of external validity which distinguishes this study from previous work that 
relates economic circumstances to time discounting.
In the face of perfect capital markets the individual discount rate should converge to the 
market interest rate. However in developing countries such markets are far from perfect and 
so differences in individual discount rates may vary for that and other reasons as borne out in 
the empirical literature (Bradford et al 2014). For example there is evidence that the discount 
rate is affected by age (Handa et al 2014b), gender (Harrison et al. 2009), education (Perez-
Arce, 2011), health (Handa et al 2014a), marital status (Bradford 2010) and even household 
size (Holden et al. 1998). The economics literature has been particularly interested in the 
role of income or wealth in determining inter-temporal choice and many analyses show that 
the poor discount more than the rich in both developed (Hausman, 1979; Lawrence, 1991; 
Harrison et al, 2002) as well as in developing countries (Pender and Walker, 1990; Yesuf and 
Bluffstone, 2008; Carvalho, 2010; Tanaka et al (2010); Holden, 2013), though there are 
some exceptions. For example, Ogaki and Atkeson (1997) argue that wealth and the discount 
rate are not correlated, Harrison et al. (2005) report that the discount rate decreased for 
Danish people reporting improvement in their economic conditions and Giné et al. (2013) do 
not find any relationship between shocks – proxied by a death of family members or an 
income shocks - and inter temporal choices.
A crucial question is why poverty conditions or negative income shocks shift preferences 
toward present gratification. According to one strand of the literature, the relationship 
between economic conditions and time preferences is mediated by neurobiological and 
psychological factors. In particular, poverty status could limit cognitive functions (Shah et 
al, 2012; Mani et al 2013) or augment stress leading people toward bad decisions (Chemin et 
al 2013; Cornelisse et al. 2013).1 Another explanation is that the poor discount more than 
the rich just because they cannot afford to do differently (Duflo, 2003). Indeed, since the 
subjective discount rate should not vary across the population under perfect capital markets, 
the role of credit constraints is considered to be a key factor determining inter-temporal 
choice in developing countries, and explaining the higher discount rates of the poor in 
particular (Holden et al. 1998; Yesuf and Bluffstone, 2008; Carvalho et al. 2014; Dean and 
Sautmann, 2014). This opens up the policy space for interventions to influence inter-
temporal decision-making. Banerjee et al (2013) report evidence in this regard using 
randomized data from India, showing that women experiencing access to microcredit 
increase expenditure on durable goods and reduce expenditure on items associated with 
instantaneous utility. Haushofer and Shapiro (2013) show that people living in rural Kenya 
receiving a lump sum are more inclined to invest in durable goods while those benefitting 
from monthly transfers are present biased (i.e. are credit and saving constrained) while 
Handa et al (2013) find that an unconditional cash transfer program implemented in Zambia 
increases the propensity to wait for future money.
Building on the literature addressing the link between economic circumstances and inter-
temporal choice, we investigate the impact of the Kenya Cash Transfer for Orphans and 
1On the other hand, Handa et al (2013) show that a positive income shock increased subjective wellbeing which lead to a reduction of 
time discounting.
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Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) on beneficiaries’ time discounting using data that was 
collected for the evaluation of the CT-OVC. A special module on preferences and 
expectations was administered during the 3rd wave of the evaluation to approximately 1800 
respondents, one-third of whom were randomly assigned to a delayed entry control arm. In a 
companion paper (Handa 2014a), we present evidence on the experience in implementing 
these hypothetical and probabilistic questions in a large scale field survey in a poor 
population and show that the responses have rates of inconsistency that are quite low and 
similar to those found in laboratory experiments in highly literate populations. Building on 
this work, the aim of this paper is to investigate the interaction between receipt of the 
transfer and the position of individuals in the credit market. The cash transfer could 
influence time preference by alleviating credit constraints and thus allowing beneficiaries to 
save and plan for the future. Alternatively an individual’s credit market position may itself 
be unaffected by the program but may act as a moderator, leading to a heterogeneous 
treatment effect whereby access to credit plus the additional cash available from the program 
together lead people to be more patient.
The paper thus contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Firstly, it provides 
evidence about the role of credit constraints in determining time discounting. Secondly, it is 
one of the few papers that investigate the impact of a national poverty alleviation program on 
time discounting and how that impact varies by the beneficiary’s credit market position. 
Finally, it is only one of two studies to investigate these questions within the context of a 
large scale national cash transfer program, thus contributing directly to the public policy 
literature on how poverty alleviation programs may affect time preference.
2. The Kenya CT-OVC
The Kenya CT-OVC reached 170,000 households and over 300,000 OVC across the country 
as of mid-2013 and is still expanding. The objective of the program, which began operating 
at scale in 2007, is to provide regular cash transfers to families living with orphans and 
vulnerable children (OVC) to encourage fostering and retention of children and to promote 
their human capital development. Eligible households, those who are ultra-poor (poorest 20 
percent) and contain an OVC, receive a flat monthly transfer of $25 (U.S.) (KES2000 in 
2015). An OVC is defined as a household resident between 0 to17 years old with at least one 
deceased parent, or who is chronically ill, or whose main caregiver is chronically ill. 
Beneficiary households are informed that, in exchange for the cash payment, the care and 
protection of the resident OVC is their responsibility though there are no punitive sanctions 
for noncompliance with this responsibility.
Targeting of households for the program is conducted in three stages. In stage one each 
Location (a Location is the fourth administrative level below province, district and division) 
forms an OVC Committee (LOC) that prepares a list of all potentially eligible households in 
the Location that meet the demographic and poverty criteria. In stage two, the list of eligible 
households is sent to the program’s central office (located within the Ministry of Gender, 
Children and Social Development), which then administers a detailed socioeconomic 
questionnaire to assess poverty and confirm eligibility in order to rank households. The final 
number of households that enters the program in each district depends on funding to that 
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district, but approximately 20 percent of the poorest households in each Location are 
enrolled in the program. In cases where more households meet the eligibility criteria than 
funds are available, households are prioritized with child-headed households receiving the 
first priority (of which there are very few), followed by elderly-headed households.
3. Data and study design
Impact evaluation design
Prior to program expansion of the CT-OVC in 2007, UNICEF designed a social experiment 
to track the impact of the program on a range of household welfare indicators including food 
security, child health, and schooling. The evaluation entailed a randomized longitudinal 
design, with a baseline household survey conducted in 2007 and a 24-month follow-up in 
2009. The ethical rationale for the design was that the program could not expand to all 
eligible Locations at the same time, so Locations whose entry would occur later in the 
expansion cycle could be used as control sites to measure impact. Within each of seven 
districts across the country (Kisumu, Homa Bay, Migori, Suba, Nairobi, Garissa, and 
Kwale), four Locations were identified as eligible, and two were randomized for immediate 
implementation and two were randomized for deferred expansion, serving as control 
Locations, for a total of 14 control and 14 intervention Locations. Targeting of households 
was carried out in all Locations according to standard program operation guidelines, and 
from the eligibility lists a sample of households was drawn, two-thirds from intervention 
Locations and the remaining third from control sites. Sample size was based on power 
calculations for the key impact indicators of school enrollment and household consumption 
expenditures. Results from the impact evaluation have been reported by the Kenya CT-OVC 
Evaluation Team (2012a, b).
In 2011, we returned to the households in the original evaluation sample that had been re-
interviewed in 2009 and administered the same household survey plus an additional module 
covering preferences and expectations. The 2011 study was approved by the University of 
North Carolina IRB and the Kenya Medical Research Institute Ethics Review Committee.
Household attrition2
The initial study period coincided with a time of political turmoil in Kenya resulting from 
the disputed national elections in December 2007. Over 1000 people died and approximately 
400,000 people were internally displaced at this time. Consequently, attrition between 
baseline and the first follow-up in 2009 was 17 percent and concentrated in Kisumu and 
Nairobi, the two Locations in the study that experienced the most election-related unrest. 
Attrition between the 2009 and 2011 rounds was only 5 percent. Table A1 in Appendix 1 
shows means of selected demographic and poverty measures for households in each arm 
across the three waves. Means for these indicators were stable across the three waves despite 
the relatively high attrition rate between 2007 and 2009, indicating that the 
representativeness of the sample remained intact.
2This section is based on Handa (2014a).
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To further explore the potential for selective or differential attrition we estimated the 
probability of attriting between 2007 and 2009 using baseline values for the variables 
reported in Table 1. The only statistically significant variables out of the 26 total variables in 
this regression were the indicators for Kisumu and Nairobi, the number of residents age 12–
17, (log of) household size and unprotected water source. To assess whether there was any 
differential determinant of attrition between the two groups we re-estimated this model 
interacting each regressor with the indicator for intervention status. In only two cases (out of 
a possible 26) was there a statistically significant interaction effect (the indicator for 
residence in Kwale, and the number of residents age 6–11). Based on the stability of 
characteristics in each arm across the waves, the fact that the two most important 
determinants of attrition stem from residence in Kisumu and Nairobi, and the minimal 
differences in the determinants of attrition across arms, the threat of selective attrition 
appears minimal. The results on the determinants of attrition are reported in Handa et al. 
(2014a).
Baseline balance
Table A1 in the Appendix compares mean poverty and selected demographic characteristics 
between treatment and control households at baseline. The set of poverty-related variables 
are balanced across arms in each wave, but there are differences in the age, sex and 
schooling levels of household heads across arms. This is due to the prioritization process 
that occurred at the central Ministry when the number of households selected by the 
communities for the program exceeded the budget. The prioritization process effectively 
gave weight to elderly-headed households. Since the final prioritization process was not 
conducted in control Locations (as they were not scheduled to enter the program 
immediately), households in the control arm of the study were sampled from the initial, 
slightly larger eligibility list than those from the intervention arm resulting in the differences 
in heads’ characteristics observed in Table A1. It is important to note however that there is 
no element of self-selection into the program; household eligibility was completely supply-
driven and take-up was universal. Below we explain our method for addressing these 
differences in demographic characteristics.
4. Empirical strategy and measures
Empirical strategy
To measure the impact of the program on people’s time discounting, we estimate the 
following regression model:
(1)
where y defines individual time discounting, T the treatment status and X a set of control 
variables measured at both the individual (i) and household (h) level. The preferences 
module was administered to the main respondent of the household and as described above 
there are small differences in demographic characteristics across arms. To account for these 
differences we re-weight the control group sample using the method of inverse probability 
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weighting (IPW), which entails estimating the probability of being in the treatment group 
using a set of covariates measured at baseline, deriving the predicted probability and then 
weighting the control sample by the inverse of this probability. Since the prioritization 
criterion is known and based on age of the head, we ‘saturate’ this regression using eight 5-
year age selection criterion Results of the estimating equation to derive the probabilities are 
available upon request; Appendix 2 reports the distribution of predicted probabilities before 
and after weighting which shows that the two distributions become much more similar after 
applying the weights. Table 1 reports means of selected characteristics of the respondents to 
the preferences module by study arm and as can be seen in Column (3), once the weights are 
applied the characteristics of the individual respondents in the control group move towards 
those of the treatment group with only the difference in mean age remaining statistically 
significant. In equation (1) we continue to include a full set of control variables to absorb 
this and any other difference between the two groups.
Inter temporal choice
In order to measure time discounting, we invited participants to carry out an inter-temporal 
choice task entailing a decision between an immediate versus a future payment. While the 
former was fixed at KES 1500, the one month future values were varied as follows: KES 
1500, 3000, 4500, 7000 and 9000 (Figure 1). We also included a KES1250 option as a check 
to see if people understood the question. Based on these responses we build two variables to 
capture impatience: an ordinal variable ranging from 1 (will wait for KES 1250) to 7 (will 
never wait for any amount) and a dichotomous variable indicating people who are never 
willing to wait for money.
Figure 1 reports the percentage of participants willing to wait for each option of payments. 
As expected, the percentage of participant that is willing to wait rises as the future value of 
the payment increases. Moreover, a substantial proportion of participants switch their 
preference from immediate money to future payments at KES 3000. Figure 1 also shows that 
more than 80 per cent of participants would wait one month for a future value of KES 9000, 
while about 16 per cent of people “always” prefer immediate money than future payments.
The order of the future value was randomized rather than listed in increasing value as in Holt 
& Laury (2002) and most laboratory or field experiments. We are thus able to identify 
inconsistent responses through ‘double-switches’, individuals who said they would wait for 
a low value and also said they will not wait for a higher value. Only eight per cent of 
respondents report a ‘double switch’ which is at the lower end of the inconsistency range 
found in controlled laboratory settings among wealthier, more literate populations (Bradford 
et al. 2014). About two-thirds of these inconsistent respondents are those who would wait 
for less money suggesting that they may not have understood this question. We exclude 
inconsistent respondents from our analysis but include those who would delay for less 
money; results are not sensitive to the exclusion of this latter group. Finally, the inter-
temporal choice task that were administered in the survey was not incentivized--this is 
simply not feasible in a large multi-topic survey, both for financial reasons and because of 
time constraints. There is debate in the literature on whether reasonable answers can be 
elicited when tasks are not incentivized (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Harrison et al, 2007; 
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Delavande et al. 2011; Weisser, 2014), but the empirical evidence on the so-called 
hypothetical bias is mixed. Real games tend to use lower rewards for practical reasons, 
which confounds the evidence that hypothetical games lead to lower discount rates (more 
patience). In fact several studies have shown that hypothetical and real games lead to similar 
responses (Johnson and Bickel 2002; Holt and Laury 2002) and one study actually reports 
greater discount rates in a hypothetical game versus a real one (Harrison et al 2002).
Access to credit
In the 2011 survey we included a small set of questions on access to credit, capturing 
whether the household currently had any outstanding loans, whether they had sought a loan, 
and if they had not sought a loan, why not. We defined households as credit constrained if 
they had sought a loan and were rejected, or if they had not sought a loan for a reason that 
indicated they felt they could not obtain a loan (lack of collateral for example), or because 
they did not know where to go or how to get one (transaction cost constrained). As a result, 
about 3 out of 4 individuals in our sample are defined as credit constrained.
Figure 2 shows that the relationship between credit constrained and wealth (measured 
through a local linear regressions - lowess) is surprisingly flat except for very low levels of 
consumption (below KES 1000) and treated households appear slightly more credit 
constrained than control households. Note that credit constraints are measured 4 years after 
program implementation so these results suggest there was no program impact on credit 
constraints of households. The relatively flat relationship may be simply a function of the 
unique sample of households, all of whom are potentially eligible for the program and so are 
quite poor (mean consumption in the sample is 60 US cents per person per day).
To investigate the determinants of access to credit we estimate regressions using a set of 
individual and household level covariates and also include treatment status—results are 
shown in Table 2 using OLS and probit specifications, both of which are weighted using the 
IPW. Having a partner in the household or being literate seem to be important determinants 
of credit access. In contrast, those living in larger households appear to be more credit 
constrained while individuals with a chronic illness are less so.
If credit constraints are an important determinant of time preference we might expect to see 
a relationship between our measure of credit access and the inter-temporal choice task we 
administered. Table 3 confirms that people without credit constraints appear more inclined to 
wait for future money. At every value of future money except for KES1250 (which is lower 
than the instantaneous option of KES1500) those with access to credit appear significantly 
more likely to wait (IES).
Mean comparisons between treated and control group
Beyond controlling for access to credit, the aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of 
the program on time discounting. Thus – as a first step – we compare the responses between 
participants in the program (treated group) and the others (control group) across the different 
payment options. As can be seen in Table 4, people in these two groups seem to respond in a 
similar way. The share of people willing to wait rises as the future value of the payment 
increases in both groups. A future value of KES 3000 represents a switch point in time 
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preferences for people in the treated as well as for those in the control group. Overall, the 
mean differences between these two groups are smaller than five points and statistically 
significant only for future values KES 9000, 4500 (at 10 per cent) and 7000 (at 5 per cent).
As before, we estimate local linear regressions to trace the relationship between propensity 
to wait and household wealth using (baseline) per adult equivalent household consumption. 
Figure 3 shows some evidence that even in this very poor sample, higher wealth is somewhat 
related to an increased propensity to wait for future money, and this pattern is stable across 
the two study arms. The proportion of households designated with access to credit is 22.5 
percent in each arm.
We next check participant responses between treated and control group controlling for 
access to credit. As shown in Table 5, the mean differences are small and not statistically 
significant between treatment and control groups without access to credit. However 
differences are slightly larger between study arms among those having access to credit. 
Indeed, the mean differences are statistically significant for KES3000, KES 7000 (at 10 
percent) and for the ordinal indicator of impatience.
5. Results
Full sample
Table 6 presents multiple regression estimates of the determinants of each of our 5 inter-
temporal choice tasks. We also include estimates in the last 2 columns of the ordinal and 
dichotomous indicators for impatience described earlier. The first row of Table 6 indicates 
that beyond the threshold value of KES3000 individuals in the program display a 3–5 point 
higher likelihood of waiting for future money but this is statistically significant only for 
KES7000 and only at the 10 percent confidence level. Access to credit generally leads to a 
greater likelihood of waiting for future money, and less likelihood of never waiting no matter 
what the amount. Other results portray an interesting story about the determinants of inter-
temporal decision-making. Literacy is strongly associated with delaying payment (by 8–9 
points) while having a disability has an even stronger effect in the opposite direction, both 
intuitive results. In the Appendix we show results for the full sample, including the 8 percent 
of individuals who had inconsistent responses.
Results by baseline consumption levels
The weak relationship between the CT-OVC and time-discounting may in part be due to the 
relatively low value of the transfer at the third round when the preferences module was 
fielded. At baseline the value of the transfer as a share of beneficiary consumption was 23 
percent. With inflation its value eroded to 18 percent in 2009 down to 11 percent by 2011. 
Consistent with the drop in the real value of the transfer, the significant impacts of the 
program on consumption (Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation Team 2012a) had dissipated by 2011 
(Romeo, Dewbre et al 2014). It could be then that the weak effects of the program reflect in 
part the erosion in the ‘intensity of the treatment’, the fact that the transfer does not represent 
a large enough increase in income to alleviate liquidity constraints and induce an impact on 
the propensity to wait for future money.
Handa et al. Page 8
J Afr Econ. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 June 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
We test this hypothesis by estimating program impacts on the poorest 50 percent of our 
sample, among whom median daily consumption is 34 US cents per person per day and the 
transfer share is 22 percent of baseline consumption. Results in the top panel of Table 7 
show that in fact the program impact is about twice as high on this set of individuals than it 
is in the full sample and several of the point estimates are now statistically significant. For 
example the program increases the likelihood of waiting for KES 4500 or 7000 by 8 
percentage points and reduces the ordinal impatience score by 0.392 (Table 7). The 
association between credit access and waiting for future money is also twice as high among 
this sample and also now statistically significant in several instances.
The bottom panel of Table 7 shows results for individuals in households with baseline adult 
equivalent consumption above the median for the sample. In contrast to the top panel of 
Table 8 here the program does not have any impact in delaying payment though access to 
credit does generally support individuals to delay payment, particularly for KES 7000 and 
9000 and credit access significantly reduces the likelihood of never choosing to delay at any 
payment level.
Heterogeneous treatment effects by credit access
If liquidity constraints in the face of imperfect capital markets affect inter-temporal choice 
and the cash transfer itself is not big enough to eliminate liquidity constraints, than the cash 
transfer combined with credit access may together be large enough to overcome liquidity 
constraints and lead to impact on the choice task. We test this hypothesis by interacting the 
treatment dummy with the credit access variable. Initial estimates showed no differential 
impact by credit access among the control group so we drop the dummy variable for credit 
access (which measures the difference among the control group) and estimate the following 
model:
(2)
In this framework β2 measures the differential treatment effect by credit access among the 
treated group only while the coefficient of the treatment dummy (β1) measures the 
difference between the treated group without credit access and the entire control group. The 
constant term in this model shows the mean value of the dependent variable among the 
control group as a whole. Table 8 shows a significant heterogeneous treatment effect of the 
CT-OVC by credit access on the order of 6 percentage points with slightly larger effect sizes 
for larger values of future money. Moreover the difference between the treated group without 
credit access and the control group, given by the coefficient of the treatment dummy, is not 
significantly different. The two bottom panels of Table 8 show results by baseline adult 
equivalent consumption. These reveal that in fact for both groups, there is a positive 
treatment effect on the propensity to wait for future money in the presence of credit access 
with effect sizes of roughly equal magnitude. It seems then that the combination of the 
increased cash from the CT-OVC program and increased access to liquidity through the 
credit market work together to affect inter-temporal choice leading individuals to be more 
willing to wait for future money.
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Using the model based on propensity to wait for KES7000 we show the predicted 
probabilities of waiting for those with and without credit access among the treated group by 
baseline consumption. The program effect is about 6 points larger on average among those 
with credit access, but increases to almost 10 points at the top of the consumption 
distribution, presumably where liquidity constraints are least binding.
6. Discussion and Conclusions
Liquidity constraints due in part to lack of access to credit are a major barrier to 
consumption smoothing and investment in developing countries (Bardhan and Udry, 1999; 
Ghosh et al 2000; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993). Median consumption among households 
eligible for the Kenyan government’s largest poverty alleviation program is 60 cents per day 
and 77 percent are credit constrained. Program participation had an important initial impact 
on consumption, but this impact dissipated by the fourth year as the value of the transfer 
eroded with inflation. Our analysis shows that the program has only a weak positive impact 
on the propensity to wait for future money after four years. However this impact doubles in 
magnitude among the very poorest for whom the transfer still represents a relatively large 
portion of total consumption, suggesting that the transfer helps alleviate liquidity constraints 
and allows individuals to place more weight on the future. And when we focus on 
individuals that are not credit constrained, we find large and statistically significant impacts 
of the program compared to households that are credit constrained. Among those with credit 
access the program increases the propensity to wait for KES3000 or more by 6 percentage 
points, and reduces the likelihood of never waiting for any sum of money by the same 
magnitude. Our interpretation of this effect is that the combination of the transfer and credit 
access is enough to relax the liquidity constraint for individuals and allows them to place 
more weight on the future.
Our results support the existing evidence that economic conditions or wealth affect inter-
temporal choice though our study differs from the previous literature in that it is based on a 
large field study rather than a small laboratory or field experiment. The results reported here 
are exciting from a policy perspective, taken as they are from a rigorous impact evaluation of 
the Kenyan government’s largest poverty alleviation program. They imply that rather than 
any deficit in cognitive functioning, the way poor people perceive and discount their future 
is influenced by their environment and it is possible to promote forward looking decision-
making by modifying these conditions through public policy. The results further show that a 
successful development intervention can achieve both equity and efficiency goals. In this 
example, an unconditional poverty targeted cash transfer program implemented on a large 
scale appears to be a win-win policy intervention: assuring social and economic protection 
on the one hand and promoting forward-looking decision-making on the other.
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Appendix 1
Table A1
Household characteristics by wave and intervention status in the CT-OVC Evaluation 
Sample
Sample: 2007 2009 2011
T C T C T C
Demographics
Household size 5.48 5.79 5.54 5.81 5.53 5.82
Female head 0.65 0.57 0.65 0.59 0.65 0.59
Age of head in years 62.34 56.06 62.21 56.20 62.55 56.55
Head not completed primary 0.53 0.38 0.53 0.38 0.53 0.38
Poverty
Per adult equiv. monthly exp. (Ks) 1533.30 1501.25 1541.77 1459.94 1550.14 1441.99
Walls of mud/dung/grass/sticks 0.75 0.84 0.75 0.86 0.74 0.87
Roof of mud/dung/grass/sticks 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.22
Floor of mud/dung 0.66 0.74 0.65 0.77 0.66 0.79
No toilet 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.54 0.56
Unprotected water source 0.62 0.68 0.61 0.70 0.61 0.70
Region
Garissa 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.05
Homa Bay 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.14
Kisumu 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.22
Kwale 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.11
Migori 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.26
Nairobi 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.06
Suba 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17
N 1540 754 1325 583 1266 545
Statistically significant (at 10%) differences of t-test between Treatment (T) and Control (C) within each wave shown in 
bold. Thirty-three new households at follow-up not included in table.
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Appendix 2
Figure A2. 
Distribution of probability scores
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Figure 1. Percent who will wait one month by future value
Note: the specific question was: “Suppose that you suddenly win money in the Lotto.
If you could choose between these payment options which do you choose?”
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Figure 2. 
Relationship between household wealth and the probability of being credit constrained, by 
study arm
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Figure 3. 
Relationship between time preference and household wealth, by study arm
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Figure 4. 
Probabilities of waiting for those with and without credit access among the treated group by 
baseline consumption
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Table 1
Mean characteristics of respondents of behavioral module
T C (unweighted) C (weighted) p-value difference (1) vs. (3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age in years 57.3 49.2 59.1 0.03
Female 79.3 72.2 77.3 0.57
Partner in household 34.5 40.4 33.5 0.68
Can read 29.9 44.0 29.9 0.91
Chronically ill (baseline)1 14.9 14.1 17.8 0.14
Disabled (baseline)1 6.3 4.0 6.3 0.98
N 1280 525 525
1Self-reported. Estimates in column (3) weighted by inverse probability weight.
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Table 2
Determinants of the access to the credit
OLS Probit
(1) (2)
T −0.00315 (−0.16) −0.0339 (−0.50)
Age 25–59 years −0.0386 (−0.68) −0.133 (−0.74)
Age 60+ years −0.0813 (−1.41) −0.298 (−1.61)
Female 0.0421 (1.52) 0.135 (1.40)
Has partner 0.0667 (2.72) 0.250 (3.04)
Can read 0.0635 (2.53) 0.187 (2.31)
Has chronic illness 0.0534 (1.99) 0.173 (1.97)
Disabled −0.00452 (−0.11) −0.0101 (−0.07)
Log consumption 0.0170 (0.89) 0.0701 (1.07)
Cattle −0.00383 (−1.21) −0.0203 (−1.36)
Goats −0.00103 (−0.76) −0.0100 (−1.04)
Sheep 0.00216 (0.60) 0.0236 (1.24)
Poultry 0.00227 (1.54) 0.00803 (1.63)
log household size −0.0635 (−2.58) −0.202 (−2.44)
Rural −0.0326 (−0.70) −0.152 (−0.84)
Observations 1,804 1,804
R-squared 0.043
Notes: Coefficients or probit marginal effects reported with t-statistics in parentheses. Also included in model but not reported are indicators for 
district. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at 10 percent.
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Table 3
Mean differences in per cent willing to wait by study arm and amount
Is willing to wait one month for KES: no access to credit access to credit p-value difference in means
1250 18.30 19.01 0.742
1500 25.25 30.28 0.046
3000 77.07 84.50 0.000
4500 79.75 86.38 0.001
7000 81.28 88.97 0.000
9000 81.35 89.44 0.000
Impatient: Ordinal 3.27 2.94 0.001
Impatient: Dichotomous 17.58 9.86 0.000
N 1378 426 1804
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Table 4
Mean differences in per cent willing to wait by study arm and amount
Is willing to wait one month for KES: T C p-value difference in means
1250 19.1 19.5 0.84
1500 26.4 26.3 0.96
3000 78.4 75.0 0.13
4500 81.1 77.5 0.09
7000 83.1 78.7 0.03
9000 83.1 79.6 0.09
Impatient: Ordinal 3.2 3.3 0.14
Impatient: Dichotomous 16.0 19.2 0.11
N 1280 525
Control group mean weighted using the Inverse Probability Weight
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